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IS PERCEPTION REALITY?: 
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE USE OF RULE 
403 FOR THE EXCLUSION OF EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Chelsea Moore* 
“But as an expert witness I try to make sure that two victims do not 
emerge from this crime, that an innocent person is not put behind bars 
while a guilty person is allowed to go free.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
DNA evidence has been used to exonerate almost two hundred 
individuals since 1989; of those two hundred people, approximately 
seventy-five percent were convicted based on evidence including inac-
curate eyewitness identifications.2  
Imagine being tried and convicted based on an eyewitness testi-
mony, a piece of evidence that scientific studies since 1923 have 
shown to be both unreliable and inaccurate.3  Now imagine that expert 
testimony regarding the inaccuracy of eyewitness identifications is 
inadmissible at trial due to the historic role that eyewitness testimony 
has played in the conviction of countless individuals, when this expert 
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following: Professor Howard M. Wasserman, for his guidance and assistance from the beginning; 
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 1 ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE 
ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT 72 (1991) [hereinafter LOFTUS & KETCHAM, 
WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE]. 
 2 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A POLICY REVIEW 2 (2009), 
available at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/The_Justice%20Project_Eyewitness_Ident-
ification_%20A_Policy_Review.pdf. 
 3 Robert J. Hallisey, Experts on Eyewitness Testimony in Court- A Short Historical Pers-
pective, 39 HOW. L.J. 237, 242 (1995).  The questioning of eyewitness identification has also been 
dated back to 1908 when Hugo Munsterberg wrote, On the Witness Stand.  He recognized that 
eyewitness evidence was much more inaccurate as generally thought.  THE JUSTICE PROJECT, 
supra note 2, at 5. 
164 FIU Law Review [6:163 
opinion may have been the difference between a verdict of “guilty” 
and “not guilty.” 
Take the incredulous case of eyewitness identifications leading to 
the arrest of Sergeant Timothy Hennis.  Hennis was accused of the 
gruesome murder of a mother and her children.4  There was no physi-
cal evidence and no motive, and the entire case hinged on two eyewit-
ness testimonies.5  Dr. Elizabeth Loftus commented that these testi-
monies were “two of the flimsiest eyewitness accounts” she had ever 
heard.6  Hennis was convicted of the murders and sentenced to death 
in 1986.7  The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed and granted 
Hennis a new trial in 1988, and, in its discussion, the court recognized 
the unreliability of the eyewitness testimonies.8  The first witness re-
vised his impression of the stature and build of the man he claimed to 
have seen.  Due to his revision, the court held that the testimony was 
overtly tenuous.9  The second witness originally stated that she had 
not seen anyone.10  Therefore, her testimony stating that she had seen 
the defendant was tentative at best.11  After a new trial, this innocent 
man was acquitted and released, but he could never be compensated 
for the years he spent on death row, away from his family and friends.  
Perhaps if an expert on eyewitness identification had been introduced 
in his first trial this travesty of justice would not have occurred. 
Over 75,000 people a year become criminal defendants on the 
basis of eyewitness identification testimony.12  Erroneous eyewitness 
identification is one of the most frequent causes of mistaken convic-
tions in the United States.13  One 1996 study found that twenty-eight 
convictions based upon eyewitness identifications have been over-
turned as a result of DNA evidence, and another study stated that 
mistaken eyewitness identifications caused more than sixty percent of 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Major Joshua M. Toman, Time to Kill: Euthanizing the Requirement for Presidential 
Approval of Military Death Sentences to Restore Finality of Legal Review, 195 MIL. L. REV. 1, 64 
(2008). 
 5 State v. Hennis, 372 S.E.2d 523, 525 (N.C. 1988). 
 6 LOFTUS & KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 114. 
 7 Id. at 109. 
 8 Hennis, 372 S.E.2d at 525. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewit-
ness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 178 (2006) (citing Press Release, Nat’l Sci. 
Found., False Identification: New Research Seeks to Inoculate Eyewitnesses Against Errors 
(Jan. 3, 1997), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/stis1997/pr971/ pr971.txt). 
 13 Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won’t - Unless It Also 
Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 263 (2002). 
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the wrongful convictions that were studied.14  As part of an effort to 
curb the overwhelming effect that eyewitness testimony has on the 
jury, defense attorneys have increasingly been relying on experts to 
lessen that impact.15   
“Our criminal justice system is not foolproof; it fails more often 
than it is comfortable to contemplate.”16  There are countless docu-
mented cases where eyewitness identification proved to be wrong.  In 
one study, out of eighty-six defendants who had been sentenced to 
death but later exonerated because of other strong evidence, fifty-four 
percent of those cases involved eyewitness testimony, and in thirty-
eight percent of the cases, eyewitness testimony was the only evidence 
against the defendant.17 
One example of eyewitness identification causing injustice is the 
case of Isadore Zimmerman.  Zimmerman was tried and convicted for 
the murder of a New York City patrolman during a robbery in 1937.18  
After he was given his last meal and prepared for the electric chair, a 
guard came in to announce that his sentence had been reduced to life 
in prison.19  After being in prison for twenty-four years, new advanced 
laboratory techniques were used to prove that Zimmerman could not 
have committed the crime, and he was subsequently released.20   
Most studies suggest that eyewitness accounts are not as reliable 
as often believed.  Despite this, few courts have recognized the value 
of experts testifying on the subject, even when the Federal Rules of 
Evidence appear to allow such testimony as evidence.  Rejection of 
this sort of testimony based on Rule 403 is attributable to courts’ con-
cern that the expert, instead of the jury, will make the credibility de-
termination of the eyewitness.21  Though the jury should make the 
ultimate credibility determination, experts informing the jury on the 
misconceptions of the reliability of the eyewitness would enhance the 
jury’s knowledge, help guide the jury in finding the relevant facts in a 
more informed way, and guide the jury to properly weigh the eyewit-
ness testimony.22 
                                                                                                                           
 14 John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 
28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 209 (2001). 
 15 United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 (M.D. Ala. 2009). 
 16 LOFTUS & KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 11. 
 17 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 19. 
 18 LOFTUS & KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 11. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. (stating that in 1983, forty-four years after Zimmerman was scheduled to die in the 
electric chair, the New York State Court of Claims awarded Zimmerman one million dollars, 
one of the largest awards for wrongful imprisonment). 
 21 See United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 22 See United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1221 (M.D. Ala. 2009). 
166 FIU Law Review [6:163 
Courts have varied in their responses to the proffer of eyewitness 
identification expert testimony.  Some courts have held that the evi-
dence was properly excluded on the ground that eyewitness identifica-
tion was not a key issue, and, therefore, the proffered expert testimo-
ny was not relevant.23  Other courts have stated that the expert testi-
mony was not necessary because cross-examination of the eyewitness 
should be sufficient.24  Further, some courts have held that expert tes-
timony might threaten the right of the jury to assess witness credibili-
ty,25 while other courts find that the jury already understands how 
memory works.26  Finally, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 has provided 
some courts with the ammunition to exclude this expert testimony on 
the basis that the expert might usurp the function of the jury, would 
lead to confusion, or would be a waste of time.27 
This Comment attempts to resolve the circuit split over whether 
courts should admit eyewitness identification expert testimony under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  This Comment considers the potential 
impact these experts will have on the jury, and whether, given the un-
reliability of eyewitness testimony, these experts are necessary.  This 
Comment argues that experts should not be excluded on the basis of 
Rule 403, but rather the admission of this testimony should be left 
within the discretion of the trial court to determine if the expert com-
ports with Rule 702.   
II.  BACKGROUND ON EXPERTS, EYEWITNESS FLAWS, 
AND EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EXPERTS 
“The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the 
annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identifica-
tion.”28 
Larry Fuller spent over eighteen years in prison after being 
wrongfully convicted of aggravated rape as the result of an erroneous 
identification.29  The eyewitness first stated that the perpetrator was 
clean-shaven and identified Fuller’s photograph in a photo-lineup (an 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 24 See, e.g., United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299-300 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 25 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 26 See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United 
States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 1992)) (finding that an expert “will not aid the jury 
because it addresses an issue of which the jury already generally is aware, and it will not contri-
bute to their understanding of the particular factual issues posed”); State v. Lawhorn, 762 
S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1988). 
 27 United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Kime, 99 
F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 28 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). 
 29 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 14. 
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old picture taken when Fuller did not have a beard).30  The problem 
was, at the time of the crime, Fuller actually had a beard, directly con-
trasting how the eyewitness initially described the perpetrator.31  Ful-
ler was later excluded as the rapist through advanced DNA testing 
methods, and Governor Rick Perry granted him a full pardon in Jan-
uary 2007.32 
A. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
“Jurors who think they understand how memory works may be 
mistaken, and if these mistakes influence their evaluation of testimo-
ny then they may convict innocent persons.  A court should not dis-
miss scientific knowledge about everyday subjects.”33 
The first test that determined the admissibility of expert testimo-
ny was the Frye test.  In Frye v. United States,34 the D.C. Circuit re-
quired that the expert not only had to have the credentials to qualify 
as an expert, but also had to show that the scientific theory and me-
thodology upon which his testimony was grounded met a threshold of 
reliability.35  The Frye test created a “general acceptance” standard.36  
The principles for admission of expert testimony at trial were formu-
lated based on reliability and whether the scientific evidence had 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.37 
Then, in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted.  
These rules led to an increasing acceptance of expert testimony gen-
erally, and Rule 702 liberalized the admissibility of expert witness tes-
timony.38  Rule 702 provides that: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon suf-
ficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1118 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
 34 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 35 Id. at 1014; see also Eric K. Gerard, Waiting in the Wings? The Admissibility of Neuroi-
magery for Lie Detection, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 14 (2008). 
 36 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). 
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principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the prin-
ciples and methods reliably to the facts of the case.39 
Rule 704 abolished the “ultimate issue” objection that blocked 
witnesses, both lay and expert, from testifying directly to facts that the 
fact-finder must determine.40  The “ultimate issue” objection was of-
ten worded as “usurping the function of the jury.”41  Rule 704(a) pro-
vides: “Except as provided in subdivision (b), the testimony in the 
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objection-
able because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact.”42  The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 704(b) rejects the 
“empty rhetoric” notion that some expert testimony is inadmissible 
because it usurps the “province of the jury.”43   
Of course, there is a way for the judge to keep out evidence and 
act as “gatekeeper” if she feels as though the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, 
waste of time, or confusion of the jury, and this is through Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403.44  However, Rule 403 is written in a way to fa-
vor admissibility.45  Rule 403 presumes admissibility by stating that 
evidence “may be excluded” if the court determines that the “proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice.”46   
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that it 
had moved away from the Frye test to a position that was in accor-
dance with the Federal Rules of Evidence.47  The Supreme Court de-
cided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,48 which involved a 
suit brought by two children and their parents against a pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturer, which had allegedly caused birth defects.49  The 
lower courts had granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
                                                                                                                           
 39 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 40 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE 
RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 620 (6th ed. 2008); see also FED. R. EVID. 704. 
 41 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 40.  
 42 FED. R. EVID. 704(a). 
 43 United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1220 (M.D. Ala. 2009). 
 44 The text of Federal Rules of Evidence 403 reads: “Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 
 45 See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 46 Id. (emphasis added); accord Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2011 (1994) (“[R]ule [403] is clearly biased in favor of 
admissibility.”). 
 47 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 582. 
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ment based on the defendant’s well-qualified expert’s affidavit that 
stated that the drug did not cause birth defects; and while the plain-
tiffs brought forth other experts on the subject to show the opposite, 
the evidence was found not to meet the “general acceptance” test es-
tablished in Frye.50  The Supreme Court reversed the motion to dis-
miss, acknowledging that “[n]othing in the text of Rule 702 establishes 
general acceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility,”51 
thereby making the Federal Rules of Evidence the test to determine 
the admissibility of expert witnesses.52 
Daubert established that it is Rule 702, and not federal common 
law, that governs the admissibility of expert testimony.53  This decision 
also rejected the “general acceptance” test established in Frye, instead 
incorporating the “general acceptance” requirement into considera-
tions that courts should look to when deciding whether to admit ex-
pert testimony.54  These factors included whether the expert would 
testify as to “scientific knowledge,” and whether the testimony would 
assist the trier of fact.55  The factors for the lower court to use when 
deciding whether the expert would testify to: 
[S]cientific knowledge include whether the scientific theory has 
been or could be tested, whether the scientific theory has been 
subjected to peer review, whether accuracy rates regarding the 
scientific basis for the evidence are known, whether standards for 
application of the technique exist, and whether the theory or 
technique has gained general acceptance.56   
These factors were not to be rigidly applied, and, in a later case, 
the Court stated that “the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district 
courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than 
would have been admissible under Frye . . . .”57  The Court later estab-
lished that the Daubert test applies to experts in all cases.58 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 597-98. 
 51 Id. at 587. 
 52 William David Gross, The Unfortunate Faith: A Solution to the Unwarranted Reliance 
upon Eyewitness Testimony, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 307, 321 (1999). 
 53 Hon. Robert P. Murrian, The Admissibility of Expert Eyewitness Testimony Under the 
Federal Rules, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 379, 380 (1999). 
 54 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. 
 55 Id. at 592-93. 
 56 Id. at 593-94. 
 57 Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997); accord Eric K. Gerard, supra note 
35, at 34. 
 58 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
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B. Flaws of Eyewitnesses 
[E]yewitnesses who point their finger at innocent defendants are 
not liars, for they genuinely believe in the truth of their testimo-
ny. . . . The face of innocence has become the face of guilt.  
That’s the frightening part the truly horrifying idea that our 
memories can be changed, inextricably altered, and that what we 
think we know, what we believe with all our hearts, is not neces-
sarily the truth.59 
The reliability of eyewitness identification has been questioned 
not only by those in the field of psychology but also by the courts.  To 
prevent misidentifications, the Supreme Court, in Manson v. Brath-
waite,60 reiterated that the criteria for examining the reliability of iden-
tifications set down in Neil v. Biggers is still essential.61  The Court in 
Brathwaite and Biggers identified five factors that a trier of fact must 
consider when evaluating the accuracy of an eyewitness account.  
These factors include: the eyewitness’ opportunity to view the crimi-
nal during the crime; the length of time in which the eyewitness got to 
view the criminal; the level of certainty demonstrated by the eyewit-
ness; the accuracy of the eyewitness’ description prior to identifying 
the criminal; and the eyewitness’ attention while the crime was occur-
ring.62  However, these instructions from the Court, as well as the due 
process procedure requirements and standard articulated by the 
Court in various cases, may not be enough as many factors influence 
eyewitness identification, and these factors are best discussed by an 
expert.63  
The Supreme Court in Brathwaite held that the lower courts may 
overlook highly suggestive police identification techniques used dur-
ing a photo lineup if there are other reliability factors that indicate the 
totality of the circumstances suggest the eyewitness made the identifi-
cation based on her memory of the crime.64  The problem with this 
allowance is that the lower courts would be dismissing what research 
                                                                                                                           
 59 LOFTUS & KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 13. 
 60 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1997). 
 61 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
 62 Id. at 199-200; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114. 
 63 Richard A. Wise et al., How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Crim-
inal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 445-47 (2009).  The Supreme Court has articulated the due 
process standard for eyewitness identification in Simmons v. United States, Kirby v. Illinois, Neil 
v. Biggers, and Manson v. Brathwaite.  See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) 
(holding that in order to determine whether an eyewitness should be able to identify a defendant 
at trial, a due process test must be applied); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972) (holding 
that due process “forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification”); Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 113-14. 
 64 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 115-16; see also Wise, supra note 63, at 448. 
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has shown: that many other factors (other than the five proscribed by 
the Supreme Court in Biggers and Brathwaite) affect eyewitness iden-
tifications.65  The lower courts would ignore the fact that research has 
shown that at least one factor that the Supreme Court has established, 
the certainty of an eyewitness, is not determinative of accuracy, and, 
in fact, suggestive procedures can increase the certainty of an eyewit-
ness and an eyewitness’ confidence and is not at all indicative of the 
reliability of an identification.66  Instead, courts should allow experts 
to testify about factors that do influence memory and perception. 
Many factors influence how an individual remembers an event.  
The bio-psycho-social factors that affect memory include perception, 
the phases of memory, and the variables that impact perception and 
memory, and the systemic factors.67  Memory depends on perception, 
and the process that goes into perception is highly selective.68 
Memory is often misunderstood.  Human memory does not 
record events in the way that a video camera would, rather memory is 
more selective.69  One aspect of identification often misunderstood is 
what is known as “weapon focus.”  When a weapon is involved during 
a crime the attention of a witness is focused on the weapon and the 
attention the witness is paying to the culprit’s facial and physical cha-
racteristics is reduced.70  Jurors sometimes believe that presence of a 
weapon can increase the reliability of eyewitness identifications,71 and 
this sort of mistaken belief is what experts would come in to court to 
educate the jury on. 
There are several factors that impact perception and memory.  
First, time is a significant factor, including the amount of time be-
tween relaying an event and the event taking place, and the rate at 
which an event happens.72  Second, the significance of the event and 
the violence that occurs during the event impacts perception.  The 
violence level of a crime matters because, even when witnesses under-
stand the significance of the event, the more violent the act, the lower 
the accuracy will be in perception and memory.73  Studies have shown 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Wise, supra note 63, at 449. 
 66 See infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliability of an eyewitness’ 
confidence as an indication of accuracy); see also Wise, supra note 63, at 449. 
 67 Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of 
Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 68 Robert Buckhout, Psychology and Eyewitness Identification, 2 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 
75, 76 (1976). 
 69 Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 195. 
 70 Id. at 196. 
 71 Id. at 197. 
 72 Fradella, supra note 67, at 17. 
 73 Id. at 19-20. 
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that a person’s ability to recall specific details of an event is worse if a 
witness has observed a violent event.74  Third, contrary to what is of-
ten believed, high stress levels can cause people not to pay sufficient 
attention and can negatively impact the ability of an individual to con-
centrate.75  Stress is often believed to aid memory, when, in reality, 
stress actually impairs memory.76  Fourth, stereotypes can influence 
how a person perceives a situation,77 as well as the age and gender of a 
witness.78 
It is almost uncontroverted that human memory process takes 
place in three stages, including “perception of the event,” “retention,” 
and “retrieval of the stored information.”79  During the perception 
stage, also known as the acquisition stage,80 time, frequency, detail 
salience, and the degree of violence all affect the initial perception.81  
Other factors such as stress, expectations, perceptual activity, and 
prior experience also affect the perception of the witness.82  Expecta-
tions can play a role in the process of memory, what someone expects 
to see will influence how an event is acquired and internalized.83 
Next, during the retention stage, the information is still “suscept-
ible to all forms of interference and decay.”84  Factors include time, 
post-event information, and intervening thoughts.85  Any one of these 
factors can influence the way in which the eyewitness remembers the 
event, and can even reinforce the identification, even if it is not accu-
rate.86   
                                                                                                                           
 74 Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 197 (finding that thirty-nine percent of respondents 
believed that violence would make memory more reliable and thirty-three percent thought 
violence would have no effect at all). 
 75 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Witness, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
241, 254-55 (1986). 
 76 Gross, supra note 52, at 316-17 (citing a 1998 study finding that when mice were placed 
in a controlled environment and stress was added in the form of a cat, the mice forgot the loca-
tion of the exit, showing the effect stress has on memory). 
 77 Kerri L. Pickel, The Influence of Context on the “Weapon Focus” Effect, 23 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 299, 299-311 (1999). 
 78 Fradella, supra note 67, at *24 (discussing how age is an important factor, and how 
children usually fail to retain as many details as adults, but the “correct” information children 
can retain is similar to that of adults, and how gender may have some significance, as women 
have been shown to have a slightly higher accuracy rate in facial recognition). 
 79 Cindy O’Hagan, When Seeing is not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimo-
ny, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 745 (1993). 
 80 Peter J. Cohen, How Shall They Be Known?  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 242 (1996). 
 81 O’Hagan, supra note 79. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Cohen, supra note 80, at 245-46. 
 84 O’Hagan, supra note 79, at 746. 
 85 Id.  
 86 See id. 
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During the retrieval stage, factors such as retrieval environment, 
specificity, and the wording of a question can influence what the eye-
witness remembers.87  One common trait is that when a witness is 
asked to recall an event they believe the event took longer than it ac-
tually did.88  Also a witness’ ability to recall a violent crime is often 
worse than recalling a non-violent crime.89  It may be surprising that 
the environment in which the witness is questioned matters in the re-
calling of the event and how a witness is questioned in terms of the 
types of questions, and whether they are open-ended or not, also plays 
a significant role in the ability to recall.90 
Other factors that have been known to lead to misidentifications 
include cross-racial identifications,91 the ways in which lineups are 
conducted,92 presence of a weapon during the crime,93 and post-
identification confirmation.94   
Cross-racial identifications are especially unreliable.95  In fact, “it 
is well documented that cross-racial identification is less reliable than 
identification of one person by another of the same race.  Considera-
ble evidence indicates that people are poorer at identifying members 
of another race than their own.”96  Studies have shown that when ju-
rors are asked to compare the reliability of an identification by an 
eyewitness of the same race versus an eyewitness of a different race, 
the jurors are often “ill-informed about the inaccuracy of cross-racial 
identification.”97  People v. McDonald is one of the few cases over-
turned because the lower court did not allow an expert to testify on 
eyewitness testimony, when the central issue in the case was cross-
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id. at 746-47. 
 88 Cohen, supra note 80, at 248. 
 89 Id. 
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racial identification and experts have shown that people have difficul-
ty identifying people of other races.98   
Another reliability factor is that, often, when a show-up99 occurs 
and the police display a single subject, this tends to be very suggestive 
to the eyewitness and the Supreme Court has acknowledged the great 
risk of misidentification when show-ups occur, as compared to line-
ups.100  “Whereas courts have generally construed of show-ups as a 
form of pressure on the witness to make a positive identification, 
eyewitness experiments tend to show that rates of positive identifica-
tion are actually lower for show-ups than for lineups.”101  But when 
lineups are properly constructed (i.e., a lineup having at least five 
good fillers),102 show-ups are more likely to yield false identifica-
tions.103   
Lineup instructions can affect the identification by an eyewitness.  
“Telling the prospective witness to pick someone or no one based 
upon their personal perception and recollection of an incident is the 
fair technique.”104  But when an officer tells the witness to “pick the 
one who did it,” this increases the likelihood of the witness making a 
choice from those presented, even if it is not accurate.105 
Sequential identification, however, is one way to avoid some of 
the unreliability of the traditional identification.  Unlike a traditional 
lineup, sequential identifications take place when an eyewitness views 
each person individually, one person at a time, and decides whether 
the person is in fact the culprit before viewing the next person, rather 
than having all members standing together and having the eyewitness 
identify one person out of the group.106  The benefit of sequential 
identifications is that the eyewitness will not make relative judgments 
about the individuals in the group.107  In other words, the eyewitness 
will not directly compare one individual to another and choose the 
person who looks most like the perpetrator when compared to the 
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others in the group, and ultimately may pick an innocent person be-
cause the eyewitness does not feel as though there is an option that 
the culprit is not in the lineup.108  But jurors have been found to be 
unaware of the fact that sequential identifications are more accurate 
than lineups.109  In one study, over three-quarters mistakenly thought 
the reliability of line-ups was more or equal to the reliability of show-
ups.110  To assist the jury in understanding the difference and in de-
termining the accuracy of the identification, an expert witness would 
testify and simply tutor the jury so that the jury could make the ulti-
mate credibility determination of the eyewitness.111  
One other factor that some jurors are unaware can affect an eye-
witness identification is the fact that the person who administers the 
identification procedure can influence the reliability of the eyewitness 
testimony.112  And, as shown in one study, a “bare majority of poten-
tial jurors” understood that having a police officer that was unaware 
who the suspect is could make a difference.113  Again, the potential 
influence of an officer’s opinion is one thing that an expert could as-
sist the jury in understanding and then the jury could make a credibili-
ty determination in the end.  No matter what identification process is 
used, the fact that the procedure needs to be “double blind” is essen-
tial to proper identifications.114  The officer performing the identifica-
tion must not know which subject is in fact the suspect so as not to 
(unintentionally) influence the eyewitness or interpret what the eye-
witness states in such a way as to fit the suspect.115 
These factors depend on psychological issues pertaining to per-
ception and memory, causing a need for expert witnesses on this topic.  
As with any statistic, the numbers vary on the percentage of times in 
which eyewitness identifications are incorrect.  Eyewitnesses identify 
a known wrong person in approximately twenty percent of all real 
criminal lineups.  This means that one in five real eyewitnesses willing 
to give sworn testimony are wrong, and yet would put a person behind 
bars for a long time.116 
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In response to the fact that eyewitness identifications are not as 
reliable as jurors might assume, besides expert testimony on the sub-
ject, courts have tried other methods to limit the effect of the eyewit-
ness testimony.  Some courts have relied on jury instructions as a way 
to lessen the weight of an eyewitness identification testimony,117 while 
other courts seem to think cross-examination should be enough.118  
However, both of these have flaws and may have no real impact on 
the jury.  Cross-examination, for example, might not be as effective 
because the eyewitness is telling what she believes is the truth, and, 
therefore, is likely to be believed by the jury and cross-examination 
loses its effectiveness.119 
Special jury instructions are not effective either.  Often, omission 
of special instructions regarding faulty eyewitness identifications is 
only a prejudicial error when identification is the “central issue” or 
“there is no corroborating evidence,” leaving the matter only within 
the trial court’s discretion.120  
The confidence of an eyewitness also has an effect on whether 
the jury believes the identification to be accurate.121  However, a wit-
ness’s confidence is not indicative of the accuracy of the identification, 
rather “confidence is a product of personality and social factors of 
which accuracy of observation is only a minor part.”122  An eyewitness’ 
confidence of her identification can fluctuate based on events after 
the initial identification, this has been referred to as “confidence mal-
leability.”123  One study found that seventy-five percent of the prose-
cutors surveyed and fifty-six percent of the citizens surveyed incor-
rectly believed that confident witnesses are likely to be more accurate 
than those that are not confident.124  Of course, “the correlation be-
tween confidence and accuracy in eyewitness identifications is far 
                                                                                                                           
al., Characteristics of Eyewitness Identification that Predict the Outcome of Real Lineups, 17 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 969, 973 (2003)). 
 117 Jennifer L. Overbeck, Beyond Admissibility: A Practical Look at the Use of Eyewitness 
Expert Testimony in the Federal Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1916 (2005) (citing United 
States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
 118 Id. at 1905. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Rutledge, supra note 14, at 225 (quoting State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 427, 464 (N.J. 
1999)); see also Peter J. Cohen, supra note 80, at 251 (discussing an experiment in which a jury 
was more likely to believe an eyewitness when the eyewitness provided little details and exerted 
confidence in his/her demeanor). 
 121 See Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 198-99. 
 122 Id. at 199 (examining survey results and finding that “jurors have no meaningful idea of 
how to evaluate witness statements of confidence and are likely to substantially overestimate the 
reliability of a confidence witness”). 
 123 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 5.  
 124 Rutledge, supra note 14, at 223 (citing Steven Penrod, Witness Confidence and Witness 
Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817, 817-22 (1995)). 
2010] Is Perception Reality? 177 
lower than people would expect.”125  Also, some confidence can be 
falsely obtained from lineup procedures where an eyewitness is unin-
tentionally reaffirmed in their belief, once again showing the need for 
a double-blind lineup procedure.126  Again, this is something that an 
expert could address if allowed to testify during trial, and may allow 
the jury to understand the complexity behind identifications, and un-
derstand that confidence of an eyewitness does not translate into ac-
curacy. 
So, while expert testimony might not be a full-proof way of get-
ting the idea of the unreliability of eyewitness across to the jury,127 it 
seems to be one of the more efficient methods. 
C. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identifica-
tion 
The experts that testify as to eyewitness identifications are typi-
cally psychologists specializing in human memory.128  These experts do 
not generally give an opinion about the accuracy of a specific identifi-
cation, but instead testify as to the human memory process and de-
scribe the psychological factors that tend to affect the reliability of 
memory.129 
The first reported decision regarding eyewitness identification 
expert testimony, Criglow v. State, was decided in 1931.130  In Criglow, 
the defendant wanted to call an expert to give his opinion as to the 
recollection of two eyewitnesses.131  Neither of the two eyewitnesses 
had ever seen the defendant prior to the robbery, and the defendant 
wanted the expert to testify as to the weaknesses in eyewitness testi-
mony.132  The trial court excluded this expert, and the Supreme Court 
of Arkansas affirmed.133  The court held that the question of whether 
the witnesses were mistaken in their identification was a question for 
the jury, and not an expert witness.134  The court found that because 
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the question put to the expert was one that “one man as well as 
another” might answer, it was within the realm of passing upon the 
credibility and weight of testimony, which the court felt should remain 
exclusively the jury's function.135 
In 1952, a California appellate court in People v. Collier, also 
found that the jury’s role would be usurped by the admission of expert 
testimony on eyewitness identifications.136  In Collier, the defendant 
wanted to introduce an expert, a psychology professor, to testify as to 
the reliability of a victim’s observation of the defendant.137  The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that the evidence was not within the 
“proper field of expert testimony” and “was a matter within the prov-
ince of the jury,”138 and the expert was therefore excluded.   
In 1973, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Amaral, a case 
in which the defendant was charged with two counts of bank robbery, 
and a significant portion of the government’s case rested on identifica-
tion by an eyewitness.139  The defense proffered testimony of a psy-
chologist, who would have explained the effects of stress on percep-
tion.140  The trial judge excluded the testimony, ruling it would be in-
appropriate to take from the jury the determination of the weight to 
be given to the eyewitness testimony.141  In this threshold federal case 
the Ninth Circuit excluded the expert testimony on the reliability of 
eyewitness identification on the basis that the unreliability of eyewit-
ness testimony and the effects of stress on perception were not outside 
the common understanding of the juror and that these were not prop-
er subjects for expert opinion testimony.142   
This case set forth a four-part test for the admissibility of expert 
testimony, requiring that: first, the defense offer a qualified witness; 
second, that the expert testify on a proper subject for expert or opi-
nion testimony on particular factor outside an ordinary person’s un-
derstanding; third, that the expert testify through an analysis that is 
generally accepted in the scientific community; and finally, that the 
probative value of the testimony outweigh any unfair prejudice.143  
This case became a highly influential case from the Ninth Circuit and 
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determined that the jury should decide the weight of the evidence of 
an eyewitness testimony, not an expert.144 
Then, in 1983, the Arizona Supreme Court was one of the first to 
finally allow the use of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewit-
ness identification.145  State v. Chapple became one of the first cases 
where a court allowed the use of expert testimony about the reliability 
of eyewitness testimony.146  The Arizona Supreme Court held that, 
under the facts, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to ex-
clude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.147  
The court followed the Amaral criteria and found that the criteria 
were met based upon the facts of the case.  The court disagreed with 
other courts disallowing expert testimony on eyewitness identifica-
tions because the matter is within the common knowledge of the jury, 
reasoning that Rule 702 only requires an expert's testimony to assist 
the jury in determining an issue.148  The court found that an expert 
could testify to general factors that might affect the reliability of the 
witnesses, but the expert could not testify to the accuracy of the spe-
cific identifications the witness made.149 
Federal circuit courts of appeals started to reverse district courts’ 
decisions not to admit eyewitness experts in 1985.150  The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals became the first federal circuit court to reverse a 
lower court’s exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony and remand 
the case for a hearing regarding the admissibility of the expert testi-
mony.151  United States v. Downing, however, discarded the four-part 
test of Amaral and substituted a three-part test.152  First, the trial judge 
was to balance the reliability of the scientific principles upon which 
the proffered testimony rests and the testimony’s potential to aid the 
jury to reach an accurate resolution of a disputed issue, against the 
likelihood that the testimony might overwhelm or mislead the jury.153  
Second, the defense had to show that the proffered testimony “fits” a 
specific problem in the identification at issue.154  Finally, even where 
proposed evidence might satisfy the first two requirements, the trial 
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court still retains discretion under Rule 403.155  The trouble with the 
court’s holding in Downing is that the court found it will only review a 
trial court decision if eyewitness testimony was the only evidence in 
the case, and not otherwise, thereby making this ruling not a clear 
solution.156 
In United States v. Rincon, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the admissibility of experts on eyewitness identifications is 
to be based on an individualized inquiry rather than a strict rule.157  In 
1993, pre-Daubert, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s 
decision that the defendant failed to establish the general acceptance 
or probative value of the subject of the expert’s testimony.158  Follow-
ing remand by the Supreme Court after Daubert, the Ninth Circuit 
remanded the case to the trial court, which once again excluded the 
testimony of the expert.159  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that the 
defendant’s proffered expert testimony failed to satisfy the Daubert 
standard.160  And although the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant 
failed to establish that the evidence was scientific, the court went on 
to decide that the evidence would help the trier of fact and was “no 
doubt relevant to his defense.”161  The court, however, stated that the 
alternative means for enhancing jurors’ awareness on the problems 
with eyewitness identifications, such as jury instructions, were availa-
ble and should be used instead of expert testimony.  “Given the po-
werful nature of expert testimony, coupled with its potential to mis-
lead the jury, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding 
that the proffered evidence would not assist the trier of fact and that it 
was likely to mislead the jury.”162  The court recognized that the result 
in this case was based on an individualized inquiry and not a strict rule 
regarding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications.163  Also, this 
idea that the jury will overwhelmingly believe the expert and put too 
much weight on their testimony appears to ignore evidence that jurors 
usually are skeptical of expert testimony.164 
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Overall, while some circuit courts have left the admissibility of 
eyewitness identification experts at the discretion of the trial courts,165 
some courts state that allowing these experts to testify will undermine 
the confidence in all eyewitness identifications and cause a battle of 
experts.166  Other courts question the validity of the science behind 
eyewitness identifications.167  Furthermore, other courts exclude ex-
perts on the general reliability of eyewitness identifications due to the 
belief that this was a matter of common understanding and would not 
have aided the jury in determining the accuracy of the identification.168  
Some courts have gone further and exclude this testimony on the basis 
of Rule 403 and the idea that it will mislead the jury or usurp the 
province of the jury. 
D. The Split on Rule 403 
That a subject is within daily experience does not mean that ju-
rors know it correctly.  A major conclusion of the social sciences 
is that many beliefs based on personal experience are mistaken.  
The lessons of social science thus may be especially valuable 
when jurors are sure that they understand something, for these 
beliefs may be hard for lawyers to overcome with mere argument 
and assertion.169 
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have split with the 
Third and Sixth Circuits over whether eyewitness identification expert 
testimony would violate Rule 403.170  The Third and Sixth Circuits 
hold that this sort of expert opinion comports with Rule 403, whereas 
the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits hold that the expert testi-
mony will usurp the jury’s role, and therefore is inadmissible under 
Rule 403.171 
The Third and Sixth Circuits have allowed experts on eyewitness 
identifications into evidence, finding that this sort of testimony com-
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ports with Rule 403.  The Third Circuit has held that the district court 
erred in its decision to exclude eyewitness testimony based on Rules 
403 and 702.172  The court stated that “[s]imilar to other types of expert 
witnesses . . . experts who apply reliable scientific expertise to juridi-
cally pertinent aspects of the human mind and body should generally, 
absent explicable reasons to the contrary, be welcomed by federal 
courts, not turned away.”173  The court held that when expert testimo-
ny of this character satisfies the reliability and fit requirements of 
Rule 702, and there is no countervailing rationale for excluding the 
evidence under Rule 403, the evidence must be admitted.174  Similarly, 
the Sixth Circuit has held that the trial court erred in excluding an 
eyewitness-identification expert under 403, specifically not violating 
Rule 403’s prohibition against evidence that invites unjustified de-
lay.175 
Conversely, the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held 
that eyewitness identification expert testimony may be excluded un-
der Rule 403.  The Second Circuit, in United States v. Lumpkin, rea-
soned that eyewitness identification expert testimony might usurp the 
jury’s role of determining witness credibility, causing jurors to be con-
fused and misled.176  
Similar to Lumpkin, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
United States v. Kime, held that the “district court properly recognized 
the very real danger that the proffered expert testimony could either 
confuse the jury or cause it to substitute the expert’s credibility as-
sessment for its own.”177  One difference in this case was that the ex-
pert was going to be specific as to whether the testimony of the eye-
witness was credible.178 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. 
Curry, held that the district court’s exclusion was proper in its exercise 
of discretion, whether under Rule 702 or 403.179  The defendants were 
convicted for conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to 
distribute in excess of fifty kilograms of marijuana.180  On appeal the 
defendants raised a number of issues including that the exclusion of 
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expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification was error.181  The 
district court had excluded the expert testimony on the basis that the 
jury is “generally aware” of the unreliability of eyewitness testimony 
and the expert would not assist the jury under Rule 702, or it could be 
considered unduly confusing or a waste of time under 403.182  The Se-
venth Circuit also acknowledged that the Rule 702 analysis incorpo-
rates Rule 403.183 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Eyewitness Identifications 
“The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy 
[and] [t]he hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable 
number of instances in the records of English and American trials.”184 
In 1983, Calvin Johnson was convicted of raping a young woman 
despite several factors that pointed to his innocence, including him 
being clean-shaven and the perpetrator being described as having a 
full beard, the victim of another almost identical rape did not initially 
identify Johnson as her attacker, and Johnson had four witnesses sup-
porting his alibi.185  Johnson received a life sentence and was not ex-
onerated until 1999, when DNA evidence was examined and Johnson 
was not a match.186 
Over 77,000 cases per year involve eyewitness identifications, and 
only 500 of those cases have expert testimony regarding the accuracy 
of eyewitness accounts.187  With numbers like that, it is not hard to see 
why eyewitness identifications are so vital to our criminal trial system 
and why some courts might be hesitant to allow experts to come in 
and explain why eyewitness identifications are not reliable and why 
they should not be believed.  Yet, juries’ acceptance of these unrelia-
ble eyewitness identifications is a leading cause, if not the leading 
cause, of wrongful convictions.188 
To date, no court has excluded eyewitness identification from tri-
al based solely on its unreliability.189  But even the Supreme Court has 
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recognized that “despite its inherent unreliability, much eyewitness 
identification evidence has a powerful impact on juries.”190  And other 
courts have recognized that “[b]ecause eyewitness testimony is such 
powerful stuff and can decide a case on its own strength, it can blind a 
jury to other exculpatory evidence or inferences.”191 
There is a desire for juries to believe eyewitness testimonies.  
“All the evidence points rather strikingly to the conclusion that there 
is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes 
the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says, That's the 
one!’”192  Due to this powerful role of eyewitness testimony, courts 
tend to want to exclude the expert testimony that would damper such 
a big part of the prosecution’s case.  However, experts would only 
inform the jury of the general phenomena that affect the reliability of 
memory, and would help to sensitize the jurors to the effects that dif-
ferent factors may have on an eyewitness’ ability to recount the 
events.193  Some studies have shown that eyewitness experts do not 
make jurors skeptical but actually promote an understanding of mem-
ory works in relation to eyewitness accuracy.194  
Still, if studies dating back to 1923 have concluded that eyewit-
ness identifications are not reliable,195 the impact of these testimonies 
should be limited to the best of the trial court’s ability. 
B. Expert Opinion in Courts 
In order to comport with Daubert and Rule 702, the expert’s tes-
timony must be the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
the witness must aid the trier of fact.  The courts finding that expert 
opinion on eyewitness testimony does not violate Rule 403 (the Third 
and the Sixth Circuits) have noted that if the expert testimony com-
ports with Rule 702 then the lower court erred in excluding it under 
Rule 403.196 
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Rule 403 allows exclusion of evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time,197 and eyewitness identification experts, in 
general, do not give rise to one of these reasons for exclusion.  Rule 
403 is written in favor of admissibility, and, as such, the assumption 
should be the evidence is admissible, and only in certain circums-
tances should evidence give rise to exclusion under Rule 403.  Be-
cause the expert is there to educate the jury in the different factors 
that can influence how someone remembers an event, experts in eye-
witness identifications do not give rise to exclusion under Rule 403 
based on the risk of causing confusion or wasting time.198 
One study of the influence of experts found that participants ex-
posed to expert testimony were less likely to convict the defendant — 
thirty-nine percent convicted — than participants who had not heard 
the expert testimony — fifty-eight percent convicted.199   
1. Reliability 
Mistaken identification “probably accounts for more miscarriages 
of justice than any other single factor.”200  So, increasingly, courts have 
begun to allow expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitnesses.  
The experts that have been allowed to testify are classically psycholo-
gists who specialize in human memory and perception.201 
In the 1970s, psychological experts discovered substantial evi-
dence that eyewitness testimony is often inaccurate.202  The experts’ 
testimonies incorporate data that has been subjected to peer review 
and the methods these experts use are generally accepted, and, there-
fore, fit within the Daubert test.203 
In cases such as United States v. Smith, when the expert on eye-
witness identification has credentials such as a Ph.D. and is a profes-
sor, as well as having written articles on the topic, the expert fits with-
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in the meaning of Daubert and should be permitted to testify so long 
as the testimony would assist the jury.204 
2. Assistance to the Jury 
Juries “tend to place great weight on eyewitness identifications, 
often ignoring other exculpatory evidence.”205  In United States v. 
Moore, the court recognized that expert testimony should be admitted 
“when there is no inculpatory evidence presented against the Defen-
dant with the exception of a small number of eyewitness identifica-
tion,” and that “in a case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewit-
ness identification, expert testimony regarding the accuracy of that 
identification is admissible and properly may be encouraged.”206  The 
argument for eyewitness identification expert testimony begins here, 
with the idea that when a defendant is being prosecuted based on a 
few eyewitness accounts, the defendant should be allowed to bring 
evidence to show that eyewitness identifications are not always accu-
rate, and further can be rather unreliable.  
Many courts reject expert testimony about eyewitness identifica-
tions on the basis that the flaws of eyewitness identifications are 
“common knowledge” and therefore the expert would not assist the 
trier of fact and does not comport with Daubert.207  However, as noted 
in many scientific studies, jurors do not know the inherent flaws in 
eyewitness identification and, therefore, an expert explaining this 
would assist them in determining what weight to give to the evi-
dence.208 
It is true that the common knowledge challenge survived Daubert 
and the expert being offered must “assist the jury.”209  Courts cannot 
assume, however, that the average juror would be aware of the va-
riables that experts discuss in their testimony of eyewitness reliability, 
as some courts argue to be the basis of exclusion of expert testimony 
on eyewitness reliability.210  Studies have shown that jurors do not 
have “common knowledge” of the unreliability of eyewitness identifi-
cation and tend to misunderstand how memory works.211  Courts have 
recognized that “potential inaccuracies of cross-racial identifications 
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are not necessarily within the common knowledge of the average ju-
ror or, for that matter, the average judge.”212   
Some courts keep out eyewitness identification experts because 
the testimony is “not beyond the ken of the jurors.”213  In other words, 
that expert testimony on the subject will not be helpful to the jury.214  
However, the helpfulness requirement in Rule 702 is a liberal stan-
dard, and a marginal improvement on the jurors’ understanding is 
typically enough.215  Also, there is evidence to show that the informa-
tion provided by experts on eyewitness identification is often “beyond 
the ken” of the jury, and judges as well as jurors often do not have an 
understanding of how memory works.216 
In United States v. Smith, the District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Alabama recognized that in a case where eyewitnesses were 
the majority of the evidence against the defendant and the two eye-
witnesses to the bank robbery conversed with each other prior to pro-
viding the testimony, an expert’s testimony would be helpful and as-
sist the trier of fact in making their determination.217 
When expert testimony satisfies the reliability and fit require-
ments of Rule 702, and when there is no countervailing rationale for 
excluding the evidence under Rule 403, the evidence should be admit-
ted.218 
3. The Issue of Rule 403 
The jury’s role is to weigh evidence presented and reach the truth 
based on that evidence.  The Rules of Evidence were put into place as 
to enhance the truth-finding process.219  Bringing in experts to explain 
eyewitness identification would not deter from this truth-finding but 
rather enhance the jury’s understanding of the truth of how memory 
works in order to make a credibility determination.220 
But some courts have reasoned that eyewitness identification ex-
pert testimony might usurp the province of the jury in determining the 
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witness’ credibility and might cause confusion or mislead the jury.221  
However, the other courts have, more accurately, held that eyewit-
ness-identification expert testimony comports with Rule 403.222  “[A]n 
expert’s opinion does not invade the province of the jury.  It is merely 
offered as any other evidence, with the expert subject to cross-
examination and the jury left to determine its weight.”223  If the expert 
testimony comports with Rule 702, it should, by reasoning, also com-
port with Rule 403.  “Pragmatically, the helpfulness’ analysis under 
Rule 702 effectively predetermines the issue [of Rule 403].  It is un-
likely the trial judge will conclude that the testimony will help the jury 
resolve a material issue, and then decide the jurors will not be able to 
understand the evidence or its purpose.”224 
Rule 704 seems to indicate that the argument used for keeping 
expert testimony out under Rule 403 is in fact the type of objection 
that was abolished by Rule 704.225 
In United States v. Mathis,226 the court reversed the decision from 
the district court that excluded eyewitness testimony based on Rules 
702 and 403.  The court explained that eyewitness-identification ex-
perts who employ “reliable scientific expertise to jurdicially pertinent 
aspects of the human mind . . . should . . . be welcomed by federal 
courts.”227 
The Sixth Circuit has also found it improper to exclude this type 
of expert testimony on the basis of Rule 403.228  In United States v. 
Smith,229 and United States v. Smithers,230 the court held that eyewit-
ness-identification expert testimony did not violate Rule 403’s prohi-
bition against evidence that invites unjustified “delay.” 
The Middle District of Alabama, in United States v. Smith, speaks 
specifically to the point that the expert testimony would usurp the 
jury’s role.231  The court addresses how it is “within the jury’s exclusive 
province” to assess the credibility of one witness, but the court also 
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notes how Rule 704(b) and the Advisory Committee Notes reject the 
notion that some expert testimony is inadmissible because it usurps 
the province of the jury.232  The court focuses on how the expert testi-
mony can be helpful “and even essential, to assisting the jury in its 
exercise of the exclusive power to determine witness credibility.”233  
The court in Smith allowed the expert to testify about eyewitness 
identification research and to “educate the jury about empirical evi-
dence regarding the previously specified areas of eyewitness-
identification research,” but the court did not allow him to speak spe-
cifically about the witnesses in the case before the court.234 
The court concluded the discussion of the admissibility of the ex-
pert witness by stating “it is difficult to see how it could possibly be 
prejudicial to provide scientifically robust evidence that seeks to cor-
rect misguided intuitions and thereby prevent jurors from making 
common errors in judgment simply by giving them more accurate in-
formation about issues directly relevant to the case.”235 
Rule 403 should not be the rule used to exclude expert testimony 
on eyewitness identifications.  There has been no showing that experts 
are a waste of time or going to mislead the jury.  Rule 403 being used 
as a way to exclude experts does not allow for the defendant to bring 
forward relevant evidence that is important to help the jury under-
stand the flaws of eyewitness identifications. 
IV.  COMMENTARY: REJECTION OF RULE 403 AS A BASIS FOR THE 
EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE UNRELIABILITY OF 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS 
“Perhaps it is precisely because jurors do not appreciate the falli-
bility of eyewitness testimony that they give such testimony great 
weight.”236 
Although there is an increasing rate of eyewitness experts being 
admitted to testify in court,237 there are still many courts that exclude 
this sort of testimony on the basis of either Rule 403 or Rule 702.  
In encouraging the use of experts on eyewitness identifications, 
the two jurisdictions that allow expert testimony on eyewitness identi-
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fications and find that these experts should not be kept out on the 
basis of Rule 403 are on the right track.238   
All relevant evidence is presumed to be admissible.239  The Fifth 
Circuit in United States v. Moore held that the eyewitness expert was 
properly excluded on the ground that eyewitness identification was 
not the key issue, and therefore the proffered expert testimony was 
not relevant.240  However, Rule 401 provides that relevant evidence is 
any “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more proba-
ble or less probable than it would be without the evidence,”241 and 
Rule 402 provides, in part, that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided.”242  As the Rules set forth a presump-
tion of admissibility so long as the evidence has “any tendency” to 
determine the truth,243 an eyewitness expert should be admissible, 
even if the eyewitness identification is not the key issue.244   
A 403 objection to an expert witness arises after evidence has 
been found to be relevant and admissible under Rule 702.  But it 
should be noted that many 403 objections that would be made are 
covered in Rule 702.245  To allow an expert to testify under Rule 702 
means that the court has determined that the witness is an expert, the 
testimony is based upon a correct application of valid scientific prin-
ciples, and the evidence is helpful to the jury in assessing the credibili-
ty of the witness.246  One of the most common grounds for a 403 objec-
tion is unfair prejudice, and it is hard to see how an expert on credibil-
ity is unfairly prejudicial.247  Also, Rule 403 allows a court to exclude 
evidence in order to avoid misleading the jury or creating confusion.248  
However, it is unlikely that a trial judge could find that the expert 
meets the helpfulness standard under Rule 702 and then find that that 
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the jury will be mislead or confused by the evidence.249  Finally, Rule 
403 allows exclusion of evidence if the evidence is a waste of time.250  
However, “[t]he advisory committee’s note to Rule 702 suggest that 
helpful expert testimony is never a waste of time.”251  An expert testi-
fying on the reliability of eyewitness identification is not a waste of 
time as it may help the jury decide the credibility of the identification, 
and lead to the jury’s ultimate determination of guilt. 
Some courts only allow experts if eyewitness identifications are 
the only evidence at trial.252  The Fifth Circuit has recognized that ex-
pert testimony on eyewitness reliability is not common knowledge and 
some of the psychological studies are “counterintuitive.”253  In United 
States v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit also specifically rejected the trial 
court’s finding that the testimony of the proffered eyewitness expert 
was within the common knowledge of the jury.254 
The problem with limiting expert testimony to when the only 
evidence is eyewitness identification is that will do nothing for the 
trials in which other evidence is presented, and, yet, in most trials, the 
eyewitness identification still has the greatest weight for the jury.  All 
eyewitness identifications present some risk of being wrong, and juries 
tend to rely on this evidence whether corroborated or not.255 
The Third Circuit in United States v. Downing reversed the lower 
court’s exclusion of an expert witness on eyewitness identifications.256  
The court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that the testimony was 
within the common knowledge of the jury and determined that the 
testimony “can assist the jury in reaching a correct decision” and 
therefore should be admitted “at least in some circumstances.”257  The 
court held that Rule 403 is “especially significant when there is evi-
dence of a defendant’s guilt other than eyewitness evidence.”258  The 
problem with Downing is that the court had reserved the right for the 
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trial court to utilize Rule 403 in order to exclude eyewitness testimo-
ny.259  The court accepted the fact that an expert’s testimony may be 
excluded if the testimony is too general or not “sufficiently tied to the 
facts of the case.”260  And, contrary to Downing, it should be the gov-
ernment who bears the burden of showing the evidence should be 
excluded on the basis that it is irrelevant.261   
The Third Circuit in Mathis recognized that excluding expert tes-
timony on eyewitness identification on the basis of 403 was unwar-
ranted.262  The court found that “[w]ith respect to the District Court’s 
concern with ‘confusing and misleading the jury’ and ‘unfair preju-
dice,’ we are unable to discern from these references . . . how such 
problems might arise.”263  This court also recognized that these experts 
do not usurp the function of the jury.  “Similar to other types of ex-
pert witnesses, who might testify about the flaws of a computerized 
filing system or the proper interpretation of satellites photographs, 
experts who apply reliable scientific expertise to juridicially pertinent 
aspects of the human mind and body should . . . be welcomed by fed-
eral courts.”264  As appreciated in Mathis, the experts are not there to 
tell the jury whether to believe the eyewitness account, but rather “to 
provide information that, if deemed credible, might cause the jury to 
evaluate [the eyewitness’] testimony in a different light.”265 
The jury ultimately will determine the witness’s credibility in a 
trial, but an expert should be able to come in to assist the jury in mak-
ing their ultimate credibility determination, deciding whether to be-
lieve an eyewitness’ account of an event.266 
Eyewitness identifications are among the most important forms 
of evidence presented in criminal trials and mistaken identifications 
appear to be the most frequent source of wrongful convictions.267  Ac-
cordingly, the defendant in a criminal case should be able to bring in 
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resources that are going to help him or her against this heavily 
weighted testimony.268 
Expert testimony should be admitted if the expert comports with 
Rule 702.  To exclude on the basis of Rule 403 seems in direct conflict 
with Rule 704.  As Rule 704 got rid of the “usurping the province of 
the jury” objection,269 courts should no longer be using this as a way to 
exclude expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identifica-
tions.  The need for such eyewitness experts is because jurors should 
be aware of the inherent flaws in this sort of testimony and be weary, 
not putting the amount of weight that they normally would.  
It should be noted that appellate courts recognize that trial courts 
are in a better position to strike a Rule 403 balancing test.270  Also, 
when the trial court does engage in the balancing process it articulates 
the rationale for its conclusion and that the conclusion “should rarely 
be disturbed.”271 
Under the Federal Rules this sort of evidence is admissible, and if 
the crux of the prosecutor’s case relies on an eyewitness, an expert 
should be allowed to come in and inform the jury on the unreliability 
of eyewitness identifications so that the jury can make a more in-
formed decision when determining the credibility of the eyewitness.  
There is an underlying fear that jurors will be skeptical,272 but is 
that not the point?  Often, eyewitness testimony is not accurate, but in 
order to keep eyewitness testimony as a major part of trials, courts fall 
back on Rule 403 to exclude experts that may demystify this crucial 
evidence. 
Case after case demonstrates how eyewitness testimony makes all 
the difference and defendants should be allowed to bring in relevant 
evidence273 including experts on eyewitness identification reliability.274  
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As Rule 403 is designed to favor admissibility,275 it should not be that 
the default is keeping out the expert testimony but that the expert 
testimony should be allowed in unless there is a showing that unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value.  
Courts fear that this sort of evidence on the unreliability of eye-
witness testimony will lead to the total disbelief of eyewitnesses, thus 
eliminating one of the strongest forms of evidence that can be offered 
by a prosecutor.  But “[t]he hope in admitting expert testimony is for 
an informed jury that is more realistically skeptical of eyewitness 
identifications.  It is impossible to know whether the admission of ex-
pert testimony will actually lead to few convictions of the innocent, 
but the many cases of misidentification mandate a change.”276 
Eyewitness identifications are too unreliable and courts should 
therefore allow defendants to put forward the best evidence they can 
to combat this heavily weighted testimony.  Courts need to recognize 
that eyewitness expert testimony can protect against the risk of incor-
rect, uncorroborated eyewitness identification, and in allowing these 
experts to come in, protect those defendants who are incorrectly iden-
tified.  Courts should recognize the importance of eyewitness experts 
that will assist the jurors in understanding the unreliability of eyewit-
ness accounts, and therefore will not give undue weight to the evi-
dence. 
Other avenues of bringing about the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification, such as cross-examination and jury instructions, are not 
as effective as expert testimony,277 although some courts still insist that 
cross-examination should be enough to bring out the flaws in eyewit-
ness identification.278  The problem with just using cross-examination 
in order to combat the eyewitness testimony is that the eyewitness 
believes her story to be true, and therefore is not susceptible to the 
usual cross-examination tactics.279 
Per se exclusion of eyewitness identifications is obviously not an 
option.  Prosecutors heavily rely on eyewitness identifications and 
these identifications play too large a part in the criminal justice system 
to get rid of them entirely.  However, admitting eyewitness experts 
allows for the court to maintain an equal balance between the neces-
sary eyewitness and the right of a defendant to have a fair trial.  Dis-
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trict courts should follow the parameters set up by circuit courts that 
have encouraged expert testimony and not excluded this evidence on 
the basis of 403. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
“Eyewitness identification error, usually unintentional, is the 
factor that is most often associated with wrongful convictions.’  Yet, 
eyewitness testimony is the most persuasive form of evidence used by 
prosecutors to convict alleged criminals.”280 
In over seventy percent of the first eighty-two DNA exonera-
tions, mistaken eyewitness identification was a factor and was the 
leading cause of wrongful convictions;281 and it has been estimated that 
up to eighty percent of the time juries believe eyewitnesses.282  With 
these numbers, criminal defendants should be able to defend them-
selves against wrongful accusations by eyewitnesses by having an ex-
pert educate the jury on the different factors that affect memory and 
perception. 
Courts are moving toward a more lenient standard and, following 
the guidance of Rule 702 and Daubert, are allowing more experts to 
come in to testify on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications.283  
There is a shift toward admissibility, although many courts are still 
excluding on the basis of Rule 702 or 403, this sort of expert testimony 
should be admissible if the expert demonstrates expertise, and the 
testimony might, if accepted by the jury, help them decide a fact at 
issue.284 
Other methods are not enough: Cross-examination and jury in-
structions are inadequate when determining the inaccuracies of eye-
witness identifications.285  Expert testimony is the best tool available 
and it is difficult to imagine that an expert appearing to testify about 
the inaccuracies of eyewitness identifications would substantially out-
weigh as to lead to this evidence being excluded.286  Therefore, Rule 
403 should not be the basis for an exclusion of experts.  Perception 
and memory complexities are not within the common knowledge of 
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the juror, and as such, expert testimony would not be a waste of time 
or cause undue delay.287  These experts are not coming in to sit as the 
fact-finder, but rather are there to give the fact-finder more informa-
tion so that they understand the complexities of memory and will not 
heavily rely on eyewitness identification. 
While having these experts might not be a panacea for false iden-
tifications and faulty convictions, it has the capability for allowing a 
jury to be more discerning in their ability to weigh evidence involving 
eyewitness identifications.   
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